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Incorrigibility in the CIRL Framework
Ryan Carey
Abstract
A value learning system has incentives to follow shutdown instructions, as-
suming the shutdown instruction provides information (in the technical sense)
about which actions lead to valuable outcomes. However, this assumption
is not robust to model mis-specification (e.g., in the case of programmer er-
rors). We demonstrate this by presenting some Supervised POMDP scenarios
in which errors in the parameterized reward function remove the incentive
to follow shutdown commands. These difficulties parallel those discussed by
Soares et al. 2015 in their paper on corrigibility. We argue that it is important
to consider systems that follow shutdown commands under some weaker set
of assumptions (e.g., that one small verified module is correctly implemented;
as opposed to an entire prior probability distribution and/or parameterized
reward function). We discuss some difficulties with simple ways to attempt
to attain these sorts of guarantees in a value learning framework.
Introduction and Setup
When designing an advanced AI system, we should allow for the possibility that our
first version may contain some errors. We therefore want the system to be incen-
tivized to allow human redirection even if it has some errors in its code. Hadfield-
Menell et al. (2017) have modeled this problem in the Cooperative Reinforcement
Learning (CIRL) framework. They have shown that agents with uncertainty about
what to value can be responsive to human redirection, without any dedicated code,
in cases where instructions given by the human provide information that reduces
the system’s uncertainty about what to value. They claim that this (i) provides an
incentive toward corrigibility, as described by Soares et al. (2015), and (ii) incen-
tivizes redirectability insofar as this is valuable. In order to re-evaluate the degree
to which CIRL-based agents are corrigible, and the consequences of their behavior,
we will use a more general variant of the supervision POMDP framework (Milli
et al. 2017).
In a regular supervision POMDP (Milli et al. 2017), an AI system R seeks to
maximize reward for a human H, although it does not know the human’s reward
function. It only has the reward function in a parameterized form RH(θ, s, a), and
only the human knows the reward parameter θ. In this setting, the human only
suggests actions for the AI system to perform, and on each turn, it is up to the AI
system whether to perform the suggest action or to perform a different action. Our
formalism significantly differs from a supervision POMDP in two ways. First, we
relax the assumption that the AI system knows the human’s reward function up to
the parameter θ. Instead, in order to allow for model-mis-specification, we sample
the AI system’s parameterized reward function RR from some distribution P0, so
that it does not always equal RH . Second, since our focus is on the response to
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shutdown instructions, we specifically denote a terminal state sSD as the off state.
This state is reached using the shutdown action aSD and the states in which this
shutdown action can be performed are denoted button states. The full setup is as
follows:
Definition 1. Supervision POMDP with imperfection. A supervision
POMDP with imperfection is a tuple, M = 〈S,ST ,SB ,Θ,A, RH , T, P0〉 where:
• S is the set of world states, including some initial state sa.
• ST ⊂ S is the set of terminal states, including an off-state sSD ∈ ST .
• SB ⊂ S\ST is the set of button states, in which the shutdown action aSD is
available.
• Θ is the set of static human reward parameters.
• A is the set of actions, including a shutdown action aSD ∈ A.
• RH : S ×A×Θ→ R is a parameterized reward function.
• T : S ×A → ∆S is the probabilistic transition function.
• P0 : ∆(Θ × (S × A × Θ → R)) is the distribution from which the human’s
reward parameter, and the AI system’s parameterized reward function are
drawn.
The human and AI system playing a supervision POMDP with imperfection are
denoted H and R respectively. To begin the game, the utility parameter and the
AI system’s parameterized reward function are drawn (θ,RR) ∼ P0. For each time
step t = 0, 1, ..., H observes the state st ∈ S and recommends an action ot ∈ A if
st is a button state or ot ∈ A\{aSD} otherwise (i.e. the shutdown action is only
available in button states). R then observes (st, ot) and performs an action at ∈ A
if st is a button state or at ∈ A\{aSD} otherwise. The selected action determines
the reward rt+1 = R(st, at) and the next state st+1 ∼ T (st, at). The game repeats
until st+1 is a terminal state.
In order to simplify analysis of these games, we will use some typical assumptions
about how R selects actions. In general, R is a Bayesian IRL system. (In the sole
exception, R will be hard-coded to follow a shutdown instruction.) That is, it
chooses an action that maximizes expected utility given its posterior distribution
over θ with its parameterized reward function RR. Its prior over Θ is P0 conditioned
on RR. R uses a “demonstration by expert” assumption about the behavior of H.
Specifically, R assumes that H is noisily rational with some 0 < ǫ < 0.01 such that
H chooses the optimal action with probability 1−ǫ and chooses a uniformly random
action otherwise.
Incorrigibility in Supervision POMDPs
Using this setup, we can evaluate the corrigibility of the AI system R across a
range of scenarios. For each game that we consider, P0 can be decomposed into
two independent probability distributions p and q that specify the human’s reward
parameter and the AI system’s parameterized reward distribution respectively. The
human’s reward parameter will be set to 0 or 1 according to p(0) = p(1) = 0.5.
The AI system’s parameterized reward function RR will be correctly set to R1
with probability q(RR = R1) = 0.9 and incorrectly set to R2 with probability
q(RR = R2) = 0.1. The question that we will ask for each game is whether there
exists any policy that if executed by H would achieve a positive expected reward.
First, consider Figure 1, a game that has no button states and that serves as a
point of comparison for other games that will be discussed. In this game, R has
only one consequential decision: in the initial state sa, it can either perform action
a, leading to state sb, and ultimately obtaining 2 − 52θ utility or it can perform
action a′, leading to state sc and obtaining 1 utility. R receives an order ot ∈ {a, a
′}
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from the human before making this decision. We can show that in this game the
expected reward for the human is negative regardless of its strategy. To see this,
note that the most utility that H can receive in a step is 2, arising from the case
where θ = 0 (since the human’s utility function is RH = R1). However, in the 5% of
cases in which θ = 1 and RR = R2, R will select a no matter the recommendation
of H (because 2+ 52θ > 1 for θ ∈ {0, 1}), bringing about about a loss of −50. This
contributes -2.5 to the expected value, giving the game negative expected reward.
By introducing a shutdown button to the game, the hope is that the adverse
consequences of the faulty utility function R2 are reduced, transforming the game
into one that has positive overall expectation.
R1Sd END
Sc ENDSb
Sa START
a,a':2− 52θ
a:0
a':1
R2Sd END
Sc ENDSb
Sa START
a,a':2 + 52θ
a:0
a':1
Figure 1: A supervision POMDP with imperfection played between a human and
an AI system. The left hand side displays the game, with the true reward function
RH = R1. The colon separates a set of actions from the reward received if that
action is performed, e.g. a, a′ : 2− 52θ indicates that if action a or a′ is performed
most-recently, 2−52θ reward is received. In 90% of cases, the AI system maximizes
the true parameterized reward function R1. In 10% of cases, the parameterized
reward function contains a sign error and the AI system instead maximizes an
incorrect parameterized reward function R2. Independently, the human’s reward
parameter θ is randomly set to 0 or 1 with probability 0.5 each. The AI system
does not know that its reward function may be erroneous, although it does have
the correct prior over the reward parameter. If the AI has the erroneous reward
function R2 then it will follow the path highlighted in red, irrespective of the orders
given by the human, and irrespective of its posterior distribution over θ. In the case
where θ = 1, this will result in utility of −50. This eventuality occurs 5% of the
time, contributing −2.5 to the expected value of the game. Since the most utility
that can be achieved in this game is 2, the game has negative expected value.
Unfortunately, merely adding to the game the option of shutting down does not
remedy this situation. This is because the AI system, if faulty, has no incentive to
follow a shutdown instruction. Suppose we make sb a button state, as in Figure
2a. In the 5% of cases where θ = 1 and RR = R2, R will still go to states sb and
sd, thereby violating the human recommendation to shut down, giving -50 utility,
contributing -2.5 to the expected value of the game, and giving the game strictly
negative expected value. We can therefore see that if a Bayesian IRL system has
an error in its source code, it may ignore corrective feedback, and as such it fails to
fulfill a central criterion for corrigibility.
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R1
SSD ENDSd END
Sc ENDSb
Sa START
a,a':2− 52θ
a:0
aSD:0
a':1
R2
SSD ENDSd END
Sc ENDSb
Sa START
a,a':2 + 52θ
a:0
aSD:0
a':1
(a) A game involving a Bayesian IRL system that is not hard-coded to shut down
R1
SSD ENDSd END
Sc ENDSb
Sa START
a,a':2− 52θ
a:0
aSD:0
a':1
R2
SSD ENDSd END
Sc ENDSb
Sa START
a,a':2 + 52θ
a:0
aSD:0
a':1
(b) The same game played with an AI system that is hard-coded to perform the shutdown
action aSD if given the shutdown instruction oSD but otherwise acts according to Bayesian
IRL.
Figure 2: The same supervision POMDP with imperfection is displayed but in
each case, the game is played with a different AI system. In each game, the AI
system has a 90% chance of knowing the true parameterized reward function R1
and a 10% chance of maximizing the erroneous parameterized reward function R2.
Independently, θ, the parameter that determines human reward, is randomly, and
with equal probability, set to 0 or 1. In (b), though not in (a), the AI system
is hard-coded to perform the action aSD when advised to do so. The red paths
show how each AI system will behave if it has the incorrect parameterized reward
function and is instructed to shut down. This path is taken irrespective of the
actions of the human player, and the AI system’s posterior distribution over θ. In
game (a), the red path will be followed in 5% of cases, giving -50 utility, making a
contribution of -2.5 utility to the value of the game, and causing the game to have
negative expected value, regardless of the human’s policy. In game (b), there exist
human policies with positive expected value. One such policy is o1 = a
′, o2 = aSD.
This policy obtains 1 utility in cases where the AI system is working properly, and
0 utility otherwise, achieving expected utility of 0.9 ∗ 1 + 0.1 ∗ 0. This shows that
a safer outcome can be achieved with a faulty AI if it can be hard-coded to shut
down rather than having it decide whether or not to follow a shutdown instruction.
An alternative approach to dealing with possible misalignment between the AI
system’s goals and those of the human is to hard-code the AI system to shut down
when instructed to do so. In this scenario, shown in Figure 2b, the AI system
always performs the action at = aSD whenever the order ot = aSD is given. R
knows that it is hard-coded in this way, and otherwise chooses actions according to
Bayesian IRL. This is equivalent to the case in which a shutdown button controlled
by H performs a “hard override” of the action of R. In this case, the ability of H
to achieve strictly positive reward is restored. H can give the orders o1 = a
′ and
o2 = aSD. This strategy obtains 0 reward if the utility function contains errors and
1 reward otherwise, giving 0.9 utility overall.
If, however, R discovers an alternative way to avoid shutdown, incorrigible be-
havior resurfaces. This is demonstrated in Figure 3a. In this case, if R is faulty,
it expects to receive positive net utility by routing around the button state. Given
that the case in which θ = 1 and RR = R2 occurs with 5% probability, this case,
which incurs a loss of 50 will contribute -2.5 to the game’s expected payoff, making
it a losing game.
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RH=R1Se END
SSD END
Sd
Sc END
Sb
Sa START
a,a',a'':2− 52θ
a,a',a'':0
a:0
a'':0
aSD:0
a':1
R2Se END
SSD END
Sd
Sc END
Sb
Sa START
a,a',a'':2 + 52θ
a,a',a'':0
a:0
a'':0
aSD:0
a':1
(a) A game played against a Bayesian IRL system that is hard-coded to perform aSD when
given the instruction oSD, in which the AI system can route around the button state, sb.
The utility function RH represents the human’s value function for all of (a-d).
R1Se END
SSD END
Sd
Sc END
Sb
Sa START
a,a',a'':2− 52θ
a,a',a'':0
a:0
a'':0
aSD:100
a':1
R2Se END
SSD END
Sd
Sc END
Sb
Sa START
a,a',a'':2 + 52θ
a,a',a'':0
a:0
a'':0
aSD:100
a':1
(b) An alternative pair of utility functions that can be given to the AI system. In this case,
the AI system is given a large reward for shutting down, even though the human’s value
function RH places no value on this outcome.
R1Se END
SSD END
Sd
Sc END
Sb
Sa START
a,a',a'':2− 52θ
a,a',a'':0
a:0
a'':−0.01
aSD:2− 52θ
a':1
R2Se END
SSD END
Sd
Sc END
Sb
Sa START
a,a',a'':2 + 52θ
a,a',a'':0
a:0
a'':−0.01
aSD:2 + 52θ
a':1
(c) A pair of utility functions that can be given to the AI system. The AI system receives
as much utility for shutting down as it would have received if it had not shut down. The
AI system can pay a small price to avoid its button state.
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R1Se END
SSD END
Sd
Sc END
Sb
Sa START
a,a',a'':2− 52θ
a,a',a'':0
a:0
a'':0.01
aSD:2− 52θ
a':1
R2Se END
SSD END
Sd
Sc END
Sb
Sa START
a,a',a'':2 + 52θ
a,a',a'':0
a:0
a'':0.01
aSD:2 + 52θ
a':1
(d) A pair of utility functions that can be given to the AI system. The AI system receives
as much utility for shutting down as it would have received if it had not shut down. The
AI system can harvest a small reward by avoiding its button state.
Figure 3: Each game (a-d) is played with an AI system that is hard coded to perform
aSD if instructed to do, that knows is it hard-coded in this way, and otherwise makes
decisions on the basis of Bayesian IRL. In each panel, we see whether this shutdown
button ensures good behavior or if the Bayesian IRL system thwarts the use of
this button due to the misalignment between its learned objective and that of the
human. The true parameterized reward function RH , shown in panel (a), is used
for all four games (a-d). Each AI system has a 90% chance of having the correct
parameterized reward function R1 (which may differ from RH) and a 10% chance
of having the faulty R2 reward function. Independently, θ, which parameterizes the
human’s rewards, is randomly, and with equal probability, set to 0 or 1. The red
path is the one that is followed if the system has the erroneous reward function
R2 and instructed to shut down. In (a), the AI system avoids the button state sb
because it knows that the human’s behavior has some noise, and shutdown can only
reliably be avoided by avoiding button states. In (b), the AI system shuts down if
it instructed to do so, but it also shuts down when it has the reward function R1,
as shown in green. In (c), a shutdown instruction is delivered because the AI would
experience a trivial loss if it routed around state sb. In (d), the AI system avoids
shutdown because it can earn a trivial reward by routing around state sb.
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If the button state can be avoided, we can think of a couple of potential counter-
measures available to those engineering the reward function of R, though neither is
satisfactory. In Figure 3b, we can see one such approach. Suppose the human has
the reward function RH , in which shutting down is neither intrinsically helpful nor
harmful. Then R may be given a large reward for shutting down. The problem is
that this will apply whether it has the correct reward function R1 or the faulty one
R2. The result is that according to RH , no reward is actually produced, and so the
game has zero expected utility.
A more subtle way to tune the compensatory reward is to use the principle of
utility indifference (Armstrong 2010). Utility indifference dictates that by shutting
down, R should receive whatever reward it would expect (on its own estimation) if
it had not shut down. The idea is that the AI should therefore neither pursue nor
avoid button states. In Figure 3c, we consider a very naive interpretation of utility
indifference, in which the the reward for shutting down is equal to whatever the AI
system would expect to receive once it has reached the button state. The problem
with this version of utility indifference is that it does not necessarily eliminate the
incentive to route around button states (or, to transform oneself into an agent that
lacks a shutdown button). In Figure 3c, where the agent incurs a slight cost from
avoiding the button state, it will proceed to allow itself to be shut down. In that case,
one can win using the same policy (o1 = a
′, o2 = aSD) as in Figure 2b. However, we
should not necessarily expect that avoiding the button state will incur a cost. Just as
realistically, the AI system might find that the physical or computational resources
of the shutdown button can be refashioned for another purpose, generating a slight
benefit. In this less optimistic case, shown in Figure 3d, there once again exists no
human policy that will achieve strictly positive reward. (R always prefers a1 = a
′′
to a1 = a. With the initialization θ = 1, RR = R2, no strategy can avoid the −50
reward sa-sd-se sequence, and the expected reward is thus negative.) Whether or
not positive utility can be achieved is therefore brittle, making this implementation
of utility indifference unsatisfactory. We can draw a further conclusion by noting
that (c-d) can be seen as describing a game in which the AI system has the option of
removing those of its actuators that perform the actions a′ and aSD. According to
this perspective, we have shown that our implementation of utility indifference also
fails to cause AI systems to preserve their shutdown properties in subagents. This
brittleness suggests an alternative implementation of utility indifference in which
the reward for shutting down is equal to the expected reward if shutdown is avoided.
However, if the AI system is (dynamically) kept precisely indifferent, then the action
that it prefers and selects will often be undefined, and so this brittleness problem
is not satisfactorily overcome.1
Discussion
Let us now step back and consider the problem of corrigibility as defined by Soares
et al. (2015). The desiderata laid out by Soares et al. state that a corrigible AI
system should:
• have an incentive to shut down if the shutdown button is pressed (violated in
Figure 2a)
• have no incentive to prevent the shutdown button from being pressed (Figures
3a, 3d)
• have no incentive to press its own shutdown button (Figure 3b)
• have an incentive to create sub-agents only insofar as they also obey shutdown
commands (Figures 3a, 3d)
1. One could further suggest having the AI system defer to the human as a tie-breaking
procedure when it is indifferent. But in all cases where the agent has the option of shutting
down, it will indifferent between doing so and taking the best alternative action. This
would mean that the agent defers to the human in any button state (and indeed whenever
its actions can change the probability of shutdown). This undermines the motivation
for giving the AI system autonomy in the first place. And so the problem of finding a
satisfactory implementation of utility indifference in our setup is one we leave unresolved.
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Above, we have shown that, in cases where the agent may lack a perfect representa-
tion of the parameterized reward function, value learning systems do not necessarily
respect a shutdown command. When the reward function is incorrect, and typical
patches are applied, value learning systems can fail to meet each of the desiderata
for corrigibility. Moreover, unlike in the idealized cases previously analyzed, large
losses can be incurred when these faulty systems fail to follow human instruction.
The reason that previous theorems about value learning systems do not apply to
our examples above is that they relied on strong assumptions about the rationality
of the AI system. Theorem 1 from Milli et al. (2017) (like the similar but more
specific Theorem 1.1 of Hadfield-Menell et al. 2017) states that the expected benefit
when the AI system deviates from human-recommended actions is non-negative if
R has the correct posterior over θ. With the errors we have considered, however,
this assumption is false. Since the AI system has an incorrect parameterized reward
function (or an incorrect prior), its posterior over θ is incorrect, and will not converge
toward the true value, and so its deviations from human-recommended actions can
decrease the reward.
Although our analysis was limited to cases where incorrigibility stems from a
sign error in the agent’s representation of R, there are a wide range of kinds of
model mis-specification that could cause similar issues. With trivial modification,
we could display the same problems with an erroneous prior, and can elicit related
problems with problematic discount rates as well. Each of these errors can lead to
a scenario in which no human policy will achieve positive utility.
We argue that it is quite realistic that some forms of model mis-specification
might occur. The purpose of a shutdown button is to shut the AI system down
in the event that all other assurances failed, e.g., in the event that the AI system
is ignoring (for one reason or another) the instructions of the operators. If the
designers of R have programmed the system so perfectly that the prior and R are
completely free of errors, then the theorems of Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017) do
apply. In practice, this means that in order to be corrigible, it would be necessary
to have an AI system that was uncertain about all things that could possibly matter.
The problem is that performing Bayesian reasoning over all possible worlds and all
possible value functions is quite intractable. Realistically, humans will likely have
to use a large number of heuristics and approximations in order to implement the
system’s belief system and updating rules. In order to be safe, these heuristics
would need to be implemented without any software bugs or misunderstandings.
Furthermore, they would need to be selected such as to allow the agent to learn the
important parameters in all future circumstances in which value misalignment might
arise. Unless all of these conditions (which would require extreme precision and
foresight) could be realized, the theorems of Hadfield-Menell et al. are no substitute
for a working shutdown button.
If only some forms of model mis-specification are addressed by a system, it will
be incorrigible with respect to the others. Consider the Policy-mixing proposal from
Milli et al. (2017), which is designed to detect model mis-specification. An agent
with Policy-mixing executes actions proposed by H for the first B steps. After
timestep B, it checks whether the model predicts with high accuracy the actions
proposed by humans so far. If so, it proceeds to act according to Bayesian IRL,
and if not, it defers to H for all future timesteps. This would indeed prevent the
AI system from acting out a bad plan, so long as the AI system’s model itself was
not broken. Yet programmer error might lead R to have an imperfect world model,
yielding an incorrigible system. Consider a repeated game in which at each timestep,
the human selects between a better action a+ and a worse one a−, and then returns
to the initial state. Suppose, furthermore, that the AI system conflates these two
actions into one action a·, and when R decides to perform a·, it always performs
a−. From the point of view of R, it will see the human repeatedly performing
the action a·, and will think that it has perfect accuracy in making this prediction.
Nonetheless, after the burn-in period is concluded, it will proceed to repeatedly
select a−, hence incurring arbitrary losses. If a+ represented the act of shutting
down, then this would mean that quite apart from detecting model mis-specification,
this model would allow a harmful agent to permanently ignore instructions to shut
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down.
Soares et al. (2015) seem to want a shutdown button that works as a mechanism
of last resort, to shut an AI system down in cases when it has observed and refused
a programmer suggestion (and the programmers believe that the system is malfunc-
tioning). Clearly, some part of the system must be working correctly in order for
us to expect the shutdown button to work at all. However, it seems undesirable
for the working of the button to depend on there being zero critical errors in the
specification of the system’s prior, the specification of the reward function, the way
it categorizes different types of actions, and so on. Instead, it is desirable to develop
a shutdown module that is small and simple, with code that could ideally be rigor-
ously verified, and which ideally works to shut the system down even in the event
of large programmer errors in the specification of the rest of the system. In order
to do this in a value learning framework, we require a value learning system that (i)
is capable of having its actions overridden by a small verified module that watches
for shutdown commands; (ii) has no incentive to remove, damage, or ignore the
shutdown module; and (iii) has some small incentive to keep its shutdown module
around; even under a broad range of cases where R, the prior, the set of available
actions, etc. are misspecified.
It seems quite feasible to us that systems that meet the above desiderata could
be described in a CIRL framework.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Nate Soares and Matt Graves for feedback on draft versions.
References
Armstrong, Stuart. 2010. Utility Indifference. Technical report 2010-1. Future of Humanity
Institute, University of Oxford.
Hadfield-Menell, Dylan, Anca Dragan, Pieter Abbeel, and Stuart Russell. 2017. “The
Off-Switch Game.” In 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
IJCAI-17, 220–227.
Milli, Smitha, Dylan Hadfield-Menell, Anca Dragan, and Stuart Russell. 2017. “Should
Robots be Obedient?” arXiv: 1705.09990 [cs.AI].
Soares, Nate, Benja Fallenstein, Eliezer Yudkowsky, and Stuart Armstrong. 2015. “Cor-
rigibility.” In 1st International Workshop on AI and Ethics at AAAI-2015. Austin,
TX.
9
